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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation analyzes the reliability of reported employee stock option 
(ESO) expense, the determination of expected life of ESOs, motivations to 
manipulate ESO expense, and the impact of noise in ESO expense on subsequent 
stock price returns. Based on unique data, this is the first paper to measure 
average historical ESO life for all employees of a broad set of firms. I find 
average life has a mean of 4.12 years. Average life is reduced by 0.38 years per 
10 percentage point increase in volatility, and industry effects explain an 
additional 7% of the variation. Reported expected life increases 0.37 years per 
year of historical life and an additional 0.16 years per year of age of the 
outstanding options. Deviations of reported volatility and life from benchmarks 
have positive correlations with deviations from own reporting history. Using 
stated assumptions rather than benchmark assumptions drops (increases) ESO 
expense by 8.3% (17.6%) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. The change in 
earnings per share decreases (increases) by $0.019 ($0.007) for the 25th (75th) 
percentile firm.  In contrast to the general findings of the extant literature, I do not 
find a direct relationship between incentives to manipulate earnings and 
deviations from benchmark values.  Nevertheless, deviations for both life and 
volatility are slightly correlated thus demonstrating subtle manipulation or 
irrational expectations.  Absolute values of deviations from benchmarks have a 
positive relationship with subsequent stock price volatility suggesting noise in 
reported stock option expense results in stock price noise.  Deviations from 
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benchmarks and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns have statistically 
significant results but are difficult to interpret.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Because employee stock options (ESOs) cannot be sold, the owner must exercise 
the option should he or she desire the cash from the option before its expiration.  
Early exercise sacrifices the remaining option value yet it is quite common.  
Theoretical papers have presented models which propose macroeconomic, firm, 
and individual characteristics that affect the likelihood of exercise and the length 
of time ESOs are held.1  Empirical papers have attempted to test these models, but 
ESO exercise data are not publicly available.2  Thus prior studies have relied on 
proprietary data for all individuals of a few firms or executives only for a broad 
set of firms.    
This dissertation presents a novel methodology for deriving the average 
life of all ESOs for a large set of firms based on SEC filings.  With these data, I 
test macroeconomic, firm, and individual characteristics that drive average ESO 
life for a wide cross-section of firms.  This is the first paper to test what is claimed 
about expected life of ESOs (for expensing purposes) against the firm’s prior ESO 
exercise history.  Through the use of benchmark values for reported expected life 
and volatility, I test for the presence of stock options expense manipulation and 
the effect that deviations from the benchmark values may have on stock price. 
I find stock price volatility, industry, vesting terms, and concentration of 
options with the top five executives drive average ESO life.  Volatility has a 
                                                 
1
 See Huddart (1994) and Carpenter (1998). 
2
 See Huddart and Lang (1996), Carpenter (1998), and Bettis, Bizjak, and 
Lemmon (2005). 
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negative relationship with ESO life while average vesting time and concentration 
have a positive relationship.  The results are qualitatively similar to studies based 
on executives only, but the explanatory power of the models is much greater.  I 
find that reported expected life has a positive relationship with the average ESO 
life of the firm, the life of the options that have yet to be exercised, and median 
industry value.  I do not find direct evidence of a relationship between incentives 
to manipulate stock option expense and deviations of expected life and volatility 
from benchmark values.  Nevertheless, these deviations have a slightly positive 
correlation with each other rather than the negative relationship theory would 
predict.  This indicates a more subtle approach to manipulation or irrational 
expectations of the future.  Deviations from benchmarks are related to subsequent 
excess stock price volatility suggesting reported values have an effect on the price 
discovery process.  I find deviations from benchmarks impact subsequent returns 
but the mechanics of the effect remain undefined. 
A better understanding of ESO exercise behavior and accuracy of reported 
ESO valuation assumptions have implications for contract design, price 
discovery, regulation, and public policy.  From a contracting perspective, the 
principal may construct a more efficient compensation package if he or she 
understands the duration of the option under various circumstances.  In term of 
the impact on price, reported valuation assumptions affect the value of stock 
option expense and net income.  Thus claims of expected life and deviations from 
reasonable values may affect stock price as investors evaluate future earnings, 
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outstanding ESO liability, and employee incentives.  Accordingly, investors, 
policy makers, regulators, and the media have an interest in accurate reporting. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
background for SFAS 123 and reviews the prior literature in detail.  Chapter 3 
describes the research design and formation of a unique measure for average life 
of options held by employees.  Chapter 4 describes the data and factors that 
explain variations in historical ESO life and reported expected life.  Chapter 5 
analyzes possible motives to manipulate ESO expense and the effect of deviations 
from the benchmarks on subsequent price.  The conclusion summarizes the 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposed a rule in 1993 that 
would require firms to change the way in which they account for ESO expense.  
Under the old method of accounting for ESOs, firms were required to expense 
only the intrinsic value of options granted, which is the exercise price subtracted 
from market price of the stock at the time of grant.  Accordingly, most firms 
maintained a policy of granting options at the money and reported no stock option 
expense.  Under the proposed ruling, firms would determine the present value of 
the options granted and expense them ratably over the course of the vesting 
period.  Facing intense opposition to the ruling, FASB weakened the final ruling 
which only required firms to state in a footnote what impact ESO expense would 
have on net income had the firm followed the originally proposed ruling.  This 
ruling, known as SFAS 123, became effective for all fiscal years ending 
December 1996.  In December 2004, with enough accounting scandals of public 
firms available as evidence for its case, FASB was able to revise SFAS 123 to 
look like the originally intended ruling.  Hence SFAS 123(R) became effective for 
fiscal years ending June 2006 and required all firms to expense stock options 
based on a fair market value (FMV) as determined by the firm. 
The intention of GAAP is that a firm values the options at the same price 
it would have to pay an outside agent to assume responsibility for the options.   
Nevertheless, there are no equivalent securities the firm can use to value the 
options since ESOs have vesting conditions and are not tradable.  Thus the firm 
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could employ a lattice model or the Black-Scholes (1973) valuation model to 
determine the FMV.  Nevertheless, these models pose a problem when applied to 
ESOs.  The value of a call option with any remaining life will always exceed its 
intrinsic value.  However, per the utility model posed by Huddart (1994), the 
option holder may derive greater utility from exercising the option at some point 
in time before option expiration.  In that event, due to non-tradability of ESOs, the 
employee will exercise the option thus sacrificing some portion of the present 
value of the option.  Empirical studies by Huddart and Lang (1996), Carpenter 
(1998), and Bettis et al (2005) provide direct evidence of early exercise.  The 
Black-Scholes model and the typical lattice model assume the option is held to 
full term by somebody since an option holder will always receive more for the 
option by selling it rather than exercising it.  Thus the value derived from the 
entire contractual length is incorporated into the value of the option.  FASB 
recognized this stylized fact and recommended using the expected holding life of 
the option in place of contractual term.  This estimated value affects the option 
value directly and indirectly as the volatility, risk-free rate, and dividend 
assumptions are based on the same time period. 
The guidance provided by SFAS 123 and 123(R) acknowledge that the 
firm must use its own judgment to determine these model inputs.  To estimate 
expected life, firms are instructed to consider the vesting period, the average 
historical holding term of similar options, and expected volatility.  Also, expected 
term may be the output of a lattice model where employees follow an exercise 
rule based on stock price to exercise price.  To estimate volatility, firms are 
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instructed to consider historical volatility, length of time firm has traded publicly, 
and mean reversion tendencies of volatility.  Dividends reflect management’s best 
estimate and the risk-free rate is based on zero-coupon government issues.  The 
statement instructs management to combine the above factors in a way that best 
reflects estimates of the future and allows for assumptions that produce the low 
range of FMV when a range of options exist and management believes no one 
choice is better than the other. 
Clearly the guidelines for determining valuation model assumptions leave 
room for both variability in beliefs of future conditions and opportunistic ESO 
expense reduction.  Table 1 demonstrates the impact a change in expected life or 
volatility can have on stock option expense and earnings.  A firm has great 
discretion in selecting estimates and the impact is material.  Analysis of these 
issues in the extant literature falls into three categories:  ESO exercise behavior, 
ESO reporting manipulation, and price relevance of stock options. 
Early exercise of ESOs is a persistent behavior predicted by theory and 
documented by several papers.  Huddart (1994) present models that demonstrate a 
utility-maximizing, risk-averse individual may exercise an inalienable ESO before 
the contractual term ends.  Likelihood of early exercise increases with stock price 
volatility and risk-aversion.  Carpenter (1998) extends the model to account for 
outside wealth and gains from change of employment.  Liklihood of early 
exercise is decreasing in outside wealth and increasing in the value gained by 
switching employers.  Murphy (1999) demonstrates that the certainty equivalent 
of an option with an FMV of $17.60 is approximately $7.88, $1.62,  
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Table 1 
Hypothetical Sensitivity Analysis of Assumption Deviations 
Panel A provides the change in the Fair Market Value of options granted had the volatility and life 
assumptions varied as stated.  Panel B repeats the process for Earnings Per Share under the assumption that 
the entire grant is expensed for the year of the grant.  The data cover 1,756 firms from 1998 to 2008. 
Panel A:  Percentage Change in Fair Market Value for Different Scenarios 
  
Percentile 
Scenario N 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
∆ Life=-1, ∆ Vol = 0 13,790 -13% -11% -9% -6% -4% 
∆ Life=0, ∆ Vol = -0.10 13,790 -34% -24% -18% -12% -9% 
∆ Life=-1, ∆ Vol = -0.10 13,790 -41% -33% -27% -21% -16% 
∆ Life= ±1, ∆ Vol = ±0.10 13,790 -58% -50% -42% -34% -27% 
Panel B:  Change in Earnings Per Share ($) for Different Scenarios 
 
 
Percentile 
Scenario N 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
∆ Life=-1, ∆ Vol = 0 13,435 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.024 0.052 
∆ Life=0, ∆ Vol = -0.10 13,435 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.045 0.077 
∆ Life=-1, ∆ Vol = -0.10 13,435 0.005 0.014 0.034 0.067 0.122 
∆ Life= ±1, ∆ Vol = ±0.10 13,435 0.010 0.028 0.066 0.133 0.242 
 
 
and $0.39 for an individual with 50% of her wealth in the firm and a relative risk 
aversion of 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 respectively.  For the individual with a relative risk 
aversion of 2.0, the certainty equivalent for the same option is approximately 
$7.80, $3.57, and $1.62 for a percentage of wealth in the firm of 50%, 75%, and 
90% respectively.  Prior literature also provides empirical results for early 
exercise.  Carpenter (1998) studies exercise data for executives at 40 firms based 
on insider forms 3, 4, and 5 filings, where observation is conditional upon 
exercise.  The data follow the exercise history for one specific grant for each firm 
and the contractual life of the entire sample falls between 1979 and 1994.  The 
sample’s mean holding period for options exercised is 5.83 years and the mean 
stock price to strike price ratio is 2.75.  Huddart and Lang (1996) collect grant and 
exercise information for ESOs awarded to 58,316 employees across eight firms 
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via voluntary survey response.  The sample period is vague but appears to be 
1980 to 1992.   The holding period of options exercised has a mean of 3.63 for 
firms granting 10 year options and 1.23 years for firms granting 5 year options.  
Bettis et al (2005) utilize Form 3, 4, and 5 filings for a broader data set than 
Carpenter (3,966 firms between 1996 and 2002) but do not attempt to match the 
exercises to the grant date.  Their data show that remaining contractual life of 
options exercised has a mean of 4.47 years. 
The guidelines for determining valuation model assumptions leave room 
for both variability in well-intentioned estimates and opportunistic ESO expense 
reduction.  Several papers have identified deviations of reported assumptions 
from benchmark values and have attempted to separate informational deviations 
and opportunistic deviations from noise resulting from estimates.  Yermack 
(1998) forms the volatility benchmark using the volatility of returns for the 
previous 120 trading days, the risk-free benchmark using the government bond 
closest in term to the expected life, and the dividend yield benchmark based on 
dividends from the previous quarter.  Expected life is used as reported.  He finds 
that firms undervalue executive options relative to the benchmarks, unilateral 
modifications to the Black-Scholes value typically decrease the value, and the 
degree of under-reporting for executive options increases as CEO pay increases 
relative to peers.   Hodder et al. (2006) formulate benchmarks for risk-free rate, 
volatility, and dividend rate using fitted values from a regression of the reported 
parameter against actual historical values and the average reported value for the 
industry.  Expected life is similar except rather than using historical life of options 
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they use the expected life reported by the firm the previous year.  The paper 
regresses deviations from the benchmarks against proxies for incentives to 
disguise compensation, manage earnings, and information of future volatility.  
The authors conclude changing environments, earnings management motivation, 
and compensation disguise motivation explain some of the deviation in model 
assumptions.  Aboody and Kasznik (2006) regress the stated FMV against a 
benchmark FMV, various incentives to disguise compensation, industry/year 
fixed effects, and controls.  The benchmark FMV is similar to Yermack as well, 
but benchmark life is the fitted value of reported life against the vesting period, 
options cancelled, options exercised, and the percent of options granted to the top 
five executives.   Their results are similar to Yermack and Hodder et al with 
volatility and life having the strongest results.  Bartov et al. (2007) utilize traded 
options to test to what degree market expected volatility and historical volatility 
are considered in formulating the volatility model assumption.  They find that 
both elements are utilized but selectively to lower ESO expense, especially when 
motivating factors are higher.  Utilizing data that span both pre and post SFAS 
123(R), Choudhary (2010) performs tests similar to the other papers but the 
regressands are both deviations from benchmarks to identify bias and the absolute 
value of deviations from benchmarks to identify accuracy.  She finds opportunism 
is stronger when options are expensed and when motivations to manage earnings 
are higher.   
One of the arguments against the original proposal of SFAS 123 was that 
investors did not understand the meaning of this non-cashflow change to earnings 
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and that stock values would be irrationally decreased.  This calls market valuation 
techniques into question since proper pricing would include the value of all 
outstanding options regardless of the expensing procedure.  Aboody (1996) uses 
pre-SFAS 123 data to test if the market prices various aspects of the ESOs.  His 
methodology is to use a modified Ohlsen (1995) model whereby price is regressed 
against earnings minus dividends, book value of equity, and the variable for 
which you wish to detect price discovery.  The generalized results are that price is 
negatively related to number of outstanding options, the present value of options 
outstanding, and the present value of older options.  Aboody et al (2004), using 
pre-SFAS 123(R) data, use the same model but include forecasted growth from 
analysts to capture incentive effects of options and instruments for disclosed (not 
expensed) option expense.  They find a negative relationship between disclosed 
options expense and price.  Bartov and Hayn (working paper), utilizing events 
that indicated the likelihood of passage of SFAS 123(R),  find a negative 
relationship between CAR and the percentage impact that expensed options would 
have on EPS, and a positive relationship between CAR and a proxy for lack of 
clarity into the firm’s business.  Frederickson et al (2005) use a survey of 
valuation professionals to determine that mandatory expensed options are deemed 
more reliable than voluntarily expensed options which they find to be more 
reliable than option expenses appearing in the footnotes only. 3   
                                                 
3
 One caveat of the two years before SFAS 123(R) is that firms had the option to 
voluntarily expense options.  The sample of firms used by  Choudhary (2010) 
show that approximately 11% of firms expensed voluntarily.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE PROXY FOR AVERAGE ESO LIFE 
 
The most unique contribution of this dissertation is the measurement of historical 
life of ESOs held by all employees of the firm.  This chapter describes the process 
by which the measurement is obtained.  Additionally, this chapters describe the 
design of benchmarks for the ESO valuation assumptions reported by firms in the 
10-K.  The purpose of the benchmarks is to provide a reference point from which 
the assumptions stated in the 10-K deviate.  These deviations can then be 
analyzed to discuss impact on reported earnings, motivations to manipulate the 
numbers, and impact on subsequent price and returns. 
 
A.  Measurement of Historical Holdings 
There is no known publicly available source of exercise data for all employees of 
the firm.  Exercise behavior of corporate insiders can be observed through 
analysis of forms 3, 4, and 5 which serve as the basis for insider filing data.   
Bettis et al (2005) and Carpenter (1998) base their studies on these data, which 
have the advantage of providing details of option exercises including the date and 
the number of shares.  These studies offer an excellent reference point for overall 
employee exercise behavior, but are inappropriate as a source of data for such a 
study.  Models like Carpenter (1998) and Huddart (1994) predict executives will 
hold options longer than average employees due to greater wealth and public 
observation of options exercise.  Thus conclusions drawn from these data may not 
  12 
represent the behavior of the overall set of ESO holders.  Another problem with 
these data is they are truncated since expirations, forfeitures, and cancellations are 
not observed.  Additionally, these data only provide information regarding a 
specific exercise and do not disclose valuable information about the number of 
options outstanding and the weighted average remaining life of those options.  In 
contrast, Huddart and Lang (1996) gather detailed data on all employees but the 
results provide no cross-sectional power since the sample spans only eight firms. 
 I address the problems of truncation, bias, and lack of cross-sectional 
variation by creating a unique measure for average holdings of all employees of 
the firm.  The 10-K reports options outstanding at the beginning and end of the 
year, the weighted average remaining contractual life of all outstanding options, 
and option activity to describe the change in options outstanding.  The change in 
options typically includes grants, exercises, and a term or two to collect 
expirations, cancellations, and forfeitures.  The data are presented graphically in 
Figure 1.  I estimate the life of all options cancelled, exercised, expired, and 
forfeited using the following procedure: 
1) The options existing at the beginning of the fiscal year will either be 
terminated (exercised, canceled, forfeited, or expired) at some time during 
the year or will remain outstanding at the end of the year.  These options 
are represented by the first and second lines in Figure 1 respectively. 
2) Assume all options granted have 9.5 years of life remaining at the end of 
the year (time, t). 
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Figure 1.  The flow of ESOs as presented by the 10-K and analysis technique.  This figure 
demonstrates the analysis technique used to estimate the life of all options terminating during the 
fiscal year.  RemLifet-1 and RemLifet are the weighted average remaining life of all options 
outstanding at the beginning and end of the year respectively.  NOutstanding,t-1  and NOutstanding,t are the 
number of options outstanding at the beginning and end of the year  respectively. NTerminated is the 
number of options that terminate during the year due to exercise, cancellation, forfeiture, and 
expiration.  NCont is the number of options outstanding at the beginning of the year that remain 
outstanding at the end of the year.  NGranted is the number of options granted during the year. 
 
 
3) Assume the number of options outstanding,  NOutstanding, t , equals the sum 
of the number granted,  NGranted , and the number of options that were 
present at the beginning of the year and made it through to the end of the 
year, Ncont. 
4) Using RemLifet , NOutstanding,t , Ncont , NGranted , and the assumption in step 1, 
calculate the remaining life of the continuing options, RemLifeCont,t .  
5) RemLifeCont,t-1 is one year greater than RemLifeCont,t . 
6) The number of options that will terminate during the year due to exercise, 
forfeit, cancellation, or expiration, Nterminated , is NOutstanding, t less Ncont .  
7) Using RemLifet-1 , NOutstanding, t-1 , Ncont , NTerminated , and RemLifeCont,t-1 to 
calculate the remaining life of the terminated options, RemLifeTerminated,t-1 .  
Time, t
NCont
NTerminated (10K)
NGranted (10K)
Fiscal Year
RemLifet-1 (10K)
NOutstanding, t-1 (10K)
RemLifet (10K)
NOutstanding, t (10K)
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8) The weighted average life of the options terminated, Lifeterminated, t , is equal 
to 9.5 less RemLifeTerminated, t-1 . 
For each firm-year, the average historical ESO life at t=T is the weighted 
average of Lifeterminated,t for the 7 years prior as shown in equation 1.   
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I keep only observations with at least 5 years of data.  Firm-years where there 
were large acquisitions or restructuring caused the number of options outstanding 
to change by ±5% are not included.  Calculating average historical life at any 
point in time poses a few challenges as well.  Ideally the measurement would 
capture the ultimate fate of all options for a specific set of options to be measured. 
Any measurement period that does not include the beginning and the termination 
of all the options in the measured set creates the following situation.  Suppose the 
measurement period for historical ESO life is the previous seven years worth of 
exercises.  The firm shown in Figure 2 has granted options at two times of 
interest.  The first grant took place several years before the beginning of the 
measurement period.  Some of the options were terminated before the 
measurement period while the rest, including any expirations, occurred during the 
measurement period.  The partial effect of missing these terminations is an 
upward bias of historical life.  The second grant took place during the fourth year 
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of the measurement period.  Some of the options were terminated during the 
measurement period but others are still outstanding at time t.  The partial effect of 
the options outstanding is a downward bias.  Thus the total effect is noise that 
increases as firms vary the size of their grants over time and as option exercise 
patterns vary over time. 
 
 
Figure 2. Exercise data that are both captured and not captured by the estimation technique.  This 
hypothetical timeline demonstrates that the seven year measurement period will miss early exercises from 
Grant A and late exercises from Grant B. 
 
 
B.  Benchmark Design 
Each benchmark is intended to provide an ideal estimate of expected volatility 
and expected life.  Firms are instructed by SFAS 123 to consider historical 
volatility, length of time firm has traded publicly, and mean reversion tendencies 
of volatility when estimating volatility.  Firms are instructed to consider the 
vesting period, the average historical holding term of similar options, and 
expected volatility when estimating expected life.  I have chosen four different 
Grant A
Grant B
Fiscal Years Relative to time, t
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
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benchmarks for volatility and life, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages: 
1. Historical Results (VolHist and LifeHist) – For volatility this is the 
annualized standard deviation of the natural log of one plus the monthly 
return, measured over the previous five years.  For expected life the 
benchmark is the average holding life of all options terminated during the 
previous seven years.  The technique for measuring average life is 
discussed in Section A.  The advantage of these measures is that they are 
simple and not subject to potentially mis-specified models, but have no 
consideration for firm qualities and industry averages. 
2. Historical and Economic Estimate (  and 	
) – These 
benchmarks are fitted values from a regression of historical values on 
cross-sectional variables.  The purpose of this benchmark is to use pooled 
historical data to better predict volatility and average life of ESOs held, 
incorporate industry averages, and lessen the impact of idiosyncratic firm 
history.  This benchmark is subject to model misspecification. 
3. Historical Reported Estimate (VolHist10K and LifeHist10K) – These 
benchmarks are simply the averages of expected volatility and expected 
life as reported in the 10-Ks of the previous 5 years.  This benchmark 
detects a change in reporting history with no reference to actual volatility 
or ESO life history.  A departure from previous measures also has no 
implication in terms of departure neither from the true value nor towards a 
true value. 
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4. Peer 10-K and economic estimate (  and 	
) – These 
benchmarks are fitted values of the regressions of reported expected 
volatility and expected life as a function of firm characteristics, industry 
averages, and other control variables.  This benchmark reflects the 
deviation from peer reported values based on industry and other economic 
characteristics.  It is subject to misspecification and fails to identify any 
global bias since the mean deviation from this benchmark is zero as a 
result of the benchmark design. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the data used in this study and provides an analysis of the 
results.  Section A describes the data.  Section B analyzes factors driving the 
exercise behavior of ESOs.  Section C provides results for various benchmarks.  
Section D analyzes incentives to manipulate the assumptions.  Section E studies 
the effect of deviations from benchmarks on stock price. 
 
A.  Data 
The data required for this study can be found in the 10-K and the proxy 
statements.  Nevertheless, no known commercially available source collects these 
data.  I start with a proprietary data set and enhance the data with hand-collected 
data.4  The data used in this study are a smaller subset of the Compustat universe.  
I discuss the reduction is sample size and possible selection bias in Appendix A. 
The period of this study is 1998 to 2009.  For any volatility analysis, I 
consider all publicly traded firms with data in both Compustat and CRSP.  For 
analysis of historical ESO life and expected life assumptions, I limit the data to 
firms that grant predominantly 10 year options.    
To classify a firm as a 10 year firm I follow several steps.  The first step is to 
use the proprietary data in combination with Execucomp to determine how 
frequently the executives of the firms get 10 year options.  If the percentage is 
                                                 
4
 I thank Dr. J. Carr Bettis, founder and CEO of Verus research, for providing 
access to Verus’ proprietary data. 
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80% or greater, the firm is considered a 10 year firm.  Next I use the proprietary 
data to identify the cases where the 10-K clearly describes the ESO contractual 
term as 10 years.  In addition, if the 10-K clearly states that options are not 10 
year options then firms identified as 10 year firms from the proxy data are 
removed. 
The life of ESOs is measured using the change of options outstanding data 
found in the 10-K as described in section A of Chapter 3.  As a review, 
Lifeterminated,T is year T’s measurement of the life of options terminated during the 
fiscal year.  LifeHist,T is the weighted average of Lifeterminated,t for the previous seven 
years.  In some cases the options outstanding from the previous year do not equal 
the options outstanding at the beginning of the year even after adjusting for splits.  
If the difference is greater than 5% then Lifeterminated,t is discarded.  I require at 
least five of the previous seven years to have a valid measurement for 
Lifeterminated,t.  Requiring at least 5 years of data results in the earliest observation 
of average life occurring in 2002.  Any 7 year window with acquisition or 
restructuring activity that changes options outstanding by ±20% was completely 
removed since the structure of the firm was significantly altered and past behavior 
may not be representative.   
 
B. ESO Exercise Behavior and Expected Life Benchmark 
The first row of Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for LifeHist. As a 
point of reference, Huddart and Lang (1996) calculate the average holding term 
conditional on exercise, meaning options expired out of the money, forfeited, and 
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canceled are not included.  Their results for the 10th percentile, median, and 90th 
percentile are 1.14, 3.00, and 6.04 years respectively while mine are 2.30, 4.12, 
and 6.00 years.  Carpenter (1998), based on observation of executives of 40 firms 
and conditional upon exercise, finds a mean of 5.83 years with a standard 
deviation of 2.25 years while my mean is 4.15 years with a standard deviation of 
1.43 years.  The Huddart and Lang results are the more reasonable comparison.  
Executives have greater wealth than the general employee base and their exercises 
are public information, thus they hold their options longer on average than the 
common employee.   
To further support this point and demonstrate the importance of a 
measurement of ESO life for all employees, I track each individual group of 
options for CEOs of 226 firms for the years 2006 thru 20095.  Table 3 shows the 
turnover of the CEO’s portfolio (percent of all options held exercised during the 
fiscal year) is significantly less than that of all employees of the same firm.  Even 
conditional upon CEO exercise of options the turnover is lower for CEOs.  More 
importantly, when executives exercise their options, the life of the options is 
significantly higher than that of all employees of the same firm.  Not reported in 
the table, the CEO’s LifeHist is greater than all employees’ LifeHist 80% of the time 
for the sample.  These differences are important because the percentage of options 
granted to the top five executives for this sample is 29% with a standard deviation 
of 15% as reported in Panel A of Table 3. 
 
                                                 
5
 The statistics for all employees include the CEO as well, so differences between 
the CEO and all employees other than the CEO are understated. 
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Table 2 
Factors Affecting ESO Life 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in Panel A.  Only seven year measurement periods are 
shown since five year measurement periods are very similar.  Panel B reports the historical life of option 
observation count per industry.  Panel C states the number of firm-year observations of historical life of 
options per firm.  Panel D presents regressions results for formulation of the life benchmarks 	
 and 
	
  .  LifeHist is the average of all options terminated during the prior seven years.    Life10K is the reported 
expected life in the 10-K.  LifeOverhang is age of the outstanding options at of the end of the fiscal year.  
	, is the Fama-French 30 median industry reported expected life.  PctTop5 is the number of options 
granted to the top five employees divided by the total number of options granted for the fiscal year.  Vest is 
the average vesting time for all options granted.  , , and   are the standard deviation of 
stock returns, market returns, and quarterly firm sales respectively for the previous five years.  Ret is the 
stock price return for the prior five years.  MaxRet is the maximum monthly return during the prior five years.  
Treas7yr is the implied return on a seven year government bond.  CAPMBeta is the market model beta for the 
prior five years.  DivYield is the dividends declared divided by the average stock price over the prior year.  
TotAsst is the total assets in millions.   Salesgrowth is the percentage change in sales from the previous year.  
M/B is the market to book ratio.  D/E is total debt divided by market equity.  ROA is operating income 
divided by total assets. R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets.  HH is the 
Herfindahl index as a measure of industry concentration at the three digit SIC code level.  All variables with a 
bar above them are averaged over the previous seven and five years for regressions 1 and 2 respectively.  
Only five year averages are shown in Panel A.  All tests control for industry fixed effects defined by Fama-
French 30 industry definitions.  Errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  Panel E provides descriptive statistics for all four benchmarks, the differences between the 
benchmarks, and the difference between volatility as stated in the 10-K and the benchmark.  LifeHist10K is the 
average of reported 10-K life for the previous five years. 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
    
Percentile 
 
N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
	 3,453 4.15 1.43 2.30 3.11 4.12 5.18 6.00 
	  2,946 5.53 1.33 4.00 4.80 5.30 6.30 7.00 
	 ! 3,453 1.14 0.88 0.26 0.62 1.06 1.56 2.25 
	, 3,272 5.38 0.47 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.80 6.00 
5PctTop  3,447 0.29 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.49 
Vest 3,438 2.25 0.81 1.33 1.81 2.13 2.54 3.00 
 3,374 0.43 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.37 0.55 0.77 

 
3,427 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 

 
3,438 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 
Ret  3,385 0.98 1.99 -0.56 -0.13 0.43 1.31 2.90 
MaxRet  3,386 0.41 0.34 0.14 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.79 
"#$%7'#((((((((((((( 3,441 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
CAPMBeta 3,380 1.17 0.86 0.26 0.57 0.99 1.58 2.27 
DivYield  3,442 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 
")*%%)%(((((((((((( 3,447 6,595.82 16,454.90 153.69 437.60 1,370.77 4,155.36 15,550.40 
+$%,#-).((((((((((((((((( 3,444 0.17 0.41 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.32 
//1(((((( 3,453 2.57 2.28 0.01 1.19 1.93 3.31 5.48 
2/3(((((( 3,405 0.52 0.97 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.57 1.28 
45*(((((( 3,447 0.00 0.16 -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 
4&2(((((( 3,447 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.15 
77((((( 3,429 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.31 
(Continued) 
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Table 2-Continued  
Panel B:  Frequency of 	 observations by Industry 
Fama-French 30 
Industry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Frequency 63 19 8 38 43 49 53 408 131 6 84 62 133 72 50 
                
Fama-French 30 
Industry 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Frequency 34 9 5 97 121 76 354 330 80 89 92 236 52 512 6 
Panel C:  	 Firm-Year Observation Count by Firm 
Firm-Years Number of Firms 
1 70 
2 71 
3 85 
4 102 
5 83 
6 106 
7 195 
(Continued) 
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Table 2-Continued 
Panel D:  Regression results for Life benchmark 
 
	 81: 	  82: 
Intercept 8.73 (6.74) 
1.25 
(1.5) 
	 
 
0.33 
(14.03) 
	 ! 
 
0.17 
(4.69) 
	, 
 
0.69 
(8.93) 
5PctTop  1.05 (3.12) 
0.18 
(1.00) 
Vest 0.12 (2.38) 
0.15 
(5.23) 
  <(((((((((81:,   82: 
-3.79 
(-6.61) 
-0.3 
(-1.06) 
  (((((((((81:,   82: 
-3.55 
(-1.59) 
2.67 
(2.98) 
  ((((((((((81:,   82: 
-0.63 
(-1.18) 
-0.04 
(-0.07) 
4)5((((((81:, 4)582: 
-0.04 
(-1.25) 
0 
(-0.34) 
/$>4)5((((((((((((81:, /$>4)582: 
0.74 
(2.71) 
-0.06 
(-0.48) 
"#$%7'#((((((((((((( 81:, "#$%7'#82: 
-47.71 
(-7.92) 
6.64 
(2.27) 
?*@/1)$((((((((((((((( 81:, CAPMBeta (2) 0.03 (0.29) 
-0.03 
(-0.61) 
2
AB
C(((((((((((( 
 
-12.49 
(-3.72) 
5.53 
(3.14) 
ln 8")*%%)%:(((((((((((((((((( 
0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.11 
(-5.36) 
ln 8+$%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( 
-0.12 
(-0.48) 
0 
(0.03) 
//1(((((( 
0.06 
(2.34) 
0.01 
(0.6) 
2/3(((((( 
0.07 
(1.07) 
0.09 
(2.69) 
45*(((((( 
0.63 
(2.02) 
-0.22 
(-1.09) 
4&2(((((( 
0.8 
(0.98) 
-0.77 
(-1.8) 
77((((( 
-0.09 
(-0.26) 
0.26 
(1.3) 
N 3,312 2,692 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.35 0.23 
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Table 3 
Option Holdings of CEOs and All Employees 
This table provides statistics for option turnover (options exercised during fiscal year divided by beginning of 
year outstanding options), the weighted average remaining life of options outstanding at the end of the fiscal 
year, and the weighted average life of options terminated (exercised, canceled, forfeited, or expired) during 
the fiscal year.  For comparison of distribution, statistics are paired for each firm-year.  The data cover 226 
randomly chosen firms for the fiscal years 2006 to 2009.   
  
Percentile   
 
N 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
Statistic 
Wilcoxon 
P-value 
All Turnover   
CEO 464 0% 0% 1% 14% 32%   
All 464 8% 11% 18% 26% 34%   
CEO – All 
(paired) 464 -26% -18% -11% -4% 7% -37789 <.0001 
Turnover conditional on CEO exercise   
CEO 248 2% 6% 12% 25% 50%   
All 248 10% 13% 20% 29% 37%   
CEO – All 
(paired) 248 -18% -13% -6% 3% 18% -5580 <.0001 
Average Life of Options Terminated   
CEO 248 4.05 5.58 8.42 9.93 9.96   
All 248 2.58 4.61 5.79 7.20 8.58   
CEO – All 
(paired) 248 -1.06 0.38 1.86 3.67 4.98 11286 <.0001 
 
Panel B of Table 2 provides an observation count for the Fama-French 30 
industry definitions.  While some industries are low in firm count, there is no need 
to remove any observations when utilizing industry fixed effects.  Panel C 
provides the distribution of observation count per firm. 
Prior research suggests many factor affect exercise behavior.  Since they cover 
only 8 firms, the results from Huddart and Lang (1996) are not generalizable 
across firm characteristics, but they can provide insight into non-firm-specific 
factors.  Their results show that prior returns, the ratio of market price to strike 
price, vesting, and pending forfeiture drive the percentage of options exercised 
any given point in time.  The results get stronger the lower ranking the employee 
within the firm.  Bettis et al (2005) utilize the Carpenter (1998) utility model and 
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calibrate it utilizing insider filings.  They present the expected term based on 
sample median values and the effect of increasing each value by 50%.  The 50% 
increase in risk aversion, volatility, probability of leaving the firm, and outside 
wealth changes expected term by -16%, -25%, -4%, and 9% respectively.  Based 
on insider filings, their regression results support that volatility, dividends, and 
unexpected returns decrease holding term while being the CEO increases it.  This 
particular test provides good insight but replication for this study is not reasonable 
for several reasons.  The data do not explicitly state the age of options when 
exercised but rather the time left to maturity.  Also the data is observable only 
upon exercise so forfeiture and expiration are not observed.  Additionally, Bettis 
et al show there are differences even within the pool of insiders based on rank in 
the organization.   
The combination of the results of Huddart and Lang (1996), Carpenter 
(1998), and Bettis et al (2005) indicate the following variable might help explain 
variations in ESO holding terms:  short-term return, long-term return, 
momentarily high market to strike price, prior volatility, forfeiture due to 
employment termination, fraction of options vested, risk aversion, outside wealth, 
dividend rate, and rank within firm.  If LifeHist can be partially explained, firms 
may be able to formulate expectations for future ESO holding terms.  I test the 
following model to explain past behavior: 
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H GKS 8+$%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( H GL//1(((((( H GM2/3(((((( H GN45*((((((
H GO4&2(((((( H GP77((((( H TSCU%)#' 3I)% 
(2) 
 
PctTop5 is the portion of all option granted that are granted to the top five 
employees.  Vest is the average time to vest for options granted (e.g. if the options 
vest equally at years 1 thru 4, the average vesting term would be 2.5 years).  
 is the annualized stock return standard deviation for the previous five 
years.   is the stock return standard deviation for the Compustat universe 
for the previous five years.   is the standard deviation of quarterly sales 
deflated by total assets for the previous five years.   Ret5 is the stock price return 
for the prior five year period.  MaxRet5 is the maximum monthly return during 
the prior 5 years and serves as a proxy for the highest market to exercise price.  
CAPMBeta is the market model beta for the prior five years.  DivYield is the 
dividends declared divided by the average stock price over the prior year.  TotAsst 
is the total assets.   Salesgrowth is the percentage change in sales.  M/B is the 
market to book ratio.  D/E is total debt divided by market equity.  ROA is 
operating income divided by total assets. Treas7yr is the implied return on a seven 
year government bond.  R&D is research and development expense divided by 
total assets.  HH is Herfindahl index for the three digit SIC code industry based on 
sales.  All variables with a bar above them are averaged over the previous seven 
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years since the age of option exercised during a given year is the culmination of 
circumstances and events over the life of the option.  Seven years accounts for the 
life of most options.  Industry fixed effects are defined by Fama-French 30 
industry definitions.  Industry effects are intended to proxy primarily for forfeiture 
rates. 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are given by Panel A of Table 2.  The 
first regression of Panel D of Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of 
equation 2.  I find long run volatility, percentage of options granted to executives, 
vesting schedule, peak returns, risk-free rate, dividend yield, market to book, 
return on assets, and industry have the greatest impact on exercise behavior based 
on the model specification of this paper.  Volatility, risk-free rate, and dividend 
yield have negative relationships with average holding life while percentage of 
options granted to executives, vesting schedule, peak returns, market to book, and 
return on assets have positive relationships.  In this model, realized volatility has a 
standardized coefficient of -0.64 and appears to be the primary driver.  The 
addition of industry effects increases the adjusted R-squared from .28 to .35 
which I believe reflects the importance of turnover and forfeiture not captured by 
the model.   
An important result of this model is the explanatory power of the model is 
significantly stronger than the explanatory power of a similar test performed by 
Bettis et al (2005).  Their regression to explain contractual years remaining at 
exercise has qualitatively similar results but the R-squared of their model is 0.07 
compared 0.35 for this model.  Huddart and Lang (1996) found volatility had a 
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much stronger impact for individual lower in the firm.  If these results are 
generalizable, then a study on executives only may miss important characteristics 
affecting exercise. 
 The inclusion of industry effects provides good explanatory power for the 
model but has the potential to weaken the economic explanation of the rest of the 
model.  To better understand the economics behind ESO exercise, I estimate 
equation 2 without the industry effects.  The results are quite informative.  All 
significant estimates from the model with industry fixed effects remain significant 
with no major change to the coefficient.  For the newly significant variables, sales 
volatility has a negative coefficient (t-statistic -2.41) and the Herfindahl index has 
a positive coefficient (t-statistic 1.84).  Higher values of the Herfindahl index 
indicate higher industry concentration.  It is quite possible that fewer firms in an 
industry provide fewer opportunities for employees to switch employers.  This 
would cause forfeiture rates to decrease and provide a positive influence on the 
life of the options. 
The measurement window for historical life of ESOs was arbitrarily set at 
seven years.  A longer window provides more data for each measurement but also 
reduces the number of usable observations for estimation of equation 2.  Utilizing 
a five year window for the same estimation increases observation count from 
3,312 to 7,045, but adjusted R-squared drops from 0.35 to 0.21.  A few estimates 
change in significance as well.  Market volatility is negative (t-statistic -3.47), the 
log of sales growth is negative (t-statistic -1.86), and ROA loses some 
significance (t-statistic 1.72). 
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The guidance by SFAS-123 instructs firms to consider their average historical 
ESO life when estimating expected life for new options granted. To better 
understand the factors firms consider when estimating expected life, I estimate the 
following equation: 
 
	 F G H G	 H GK	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,
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%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( H GO//1(((((( H GP2/3(((((( H GQ45*((((((
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I)% 
(3) 
 
 The intention of this regression is to relate what each firm claims to what 
other firms claim while considering economic factors.  The bar above a variable 
indicates a five year average which is used as an estimate for each value looking 
forward.  LifeOverhang is the age of the outstanding options as of the end of the 
fiscal year.  	, is the Fama-French 30 median industry reported expected 
life.    is the volatility benchmark equivalent to this benchmark as described 
in Appendix B.  All other variables have been described previously with the only 
differences being Ret5 and MaxRet5 are measured over the previous five years.  
The second regression of Panel D of Table 2 shows the estimation results.  It 
appears firms consider their prior exercise history as the coefficient is 0.33.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on the age of the options still outstanding is 0.17, so 
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the option overhang factors into the estimate as well.  These are important results 
that demonstrates firms consider their own exercise history.  The strong positive 
relationship with the industry median reported value also indicates that firms are 
somewhat aligned on their assumptions.  When reported expected life is regressed 
against the same variables used with the historical life regression, there are some 
inconsistencies.  The percent of options granted to executives and divided yield 
have no significance, historical market volatility and the treasury rate have the 
opposite sign, and firm size has a negative coefficient. 
Unlike the estimation for historical life of ESO, removal of industry effects 
has very little impact on the estimation of equation 3.  Nevertheless, removal of 
the industry median volatility assumption along with industry effects, to break the 
connection to industry, does decrease adjusted R-squared from 0.28 to 0.18.  The 
new estimation still provides no additional significance to any estimates.  
 
C.  Benchmarks 
The purpose of constructing benchmark values for expected life and volatility is 
to set a reasonable reference point and then measure how far from that point a 
firm deviates from the reference for any given firm-year.  I start first with an 
analysis of the reported ESO valuation assumptions in the 10-K.  Figure 3 shows 
the reported assumptions over time.  Expected Volatility and Expected Life both 
appear to be somewhat stable over time in the middle and lower percentiles while 
the upper percentiles have dropped over time.  The standard deviation of reported 
values has also dropped over time.  The trends suggest that models assumptions 
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stabilized around the time that pro-forma stock option expense became a true 
expense in the income statement.  Panels A and B of Table 4 provide the 
descriptive statistics for the sample and correlations between the assumptions.  
Panel C relates expected life to all of the assumptions simultaneously.  
Assumptions appear to follow theory in terms of the relationship between 
expected life and expected volatility.  Oddly enough, the expected dividend yield 
has a positive relationship with expected life. 
I construct four benchmarks for expected life.  The first, 	 , is the 
historical estimate constructed in Section 3.  The second, 	
 , is the fitted 
value from the estimation of Equation 2.  The third benchmark, LifeHist10K, is the 
average of the reported expected life for the previous five years.  I require a 
minimum of three observations to form this benchmark.  The fourth benchmark, 
	
, is the is the fitted value of equation 3.  I construct four similar 
benchmarks for volatility which are detailed in Appendix B. 
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Panel A:  10-K Life 
 
Panel B:  10-K Volatility 
 
Figure 3.  10-K Valuation Assumptions.  The graphs provide various percentiles of stated assumptions over 
time.  Volatility of assumptions depicts the dispersion among firms for a given year.  Panel C is based only 
on non-zero dividend assumptions thus representing a portion of the available data.  Panel D shows the 
percentage of dividend assumptions that are non-zero. 
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Panel C:  10-K Dividend 
 
Panel D:  Percent of All Expected Divdends that are Non-zero 
 
Figure 3-Continued 
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Table 4 
Analysis of 10-K Assumptions 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the valuation assumptions presented in the 10-K per SFAS 
123(R).  Panel B provides correlations among the assumptions.  The lower left portion of the table presents 
the Pearson correlations, and the upper right half presents the Spearman correlations.  The four variables 
analyzed are the valuation assumptions as stated in the 10-K.  Expected Life is filtered on likely 10-year 
grants.  The data covers 1,180 firms from 1998 to 2008.  The p-value to test the hypothesis that the 
correlation is equal to zero is in parentheses.  Panel C provides regression results where Expected Life is the 
dependent variable and the remaining assumptions are the independent variables.  All variables are 
Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  T-statistics for standard errors are reported in parentheses.     
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics 
    
Percentile 
Variable N Mean Std 
Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Volatility 26,361 0.48 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.41 0.60 0.80 
Life 14,511 5.61 1.55 4.00 4.70 5.30 6.50 7.50 
Div Yield 31,599 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Risk-Free 26,693 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Panel B:  Correlations 
 
Volatility Life Div Yield Risk-Free 
Volatility 1.00 -0.24 -0.63 -0.09 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Life -0.24 1.00 0.25 0.17 (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Div Yield -0.63 0.25 1.00 0.05 (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Risk-Free -0.09 0.17 0.05 1.00 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
Panel C:  Regression of Expected Life on 10-K Assumptions 
Intercept 4.75 (80.49) 
Volatility -0.74 (-12.14) 
Risk-Free 23.45 (21.89) 
Div Yield 14.43 (17.84) 
N 13,003 
R-Squared 0.10 
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Panel A of Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the life benchmarks 
and deviations of reported expected life from those benchmarks.  The most 
notable statistic is that reported expected life is 1.54 years greater than the 
measurement for historical life.  Panel B provides statistics for the volatility 
benchmarks and the deviations from the benchmarks.  Disclosed values deviate 
from historical measures on average by -0.01 with a standard deviation of 
approximately 0.14.  Expected volatility minus own historical reported volatility 
has a mean of -0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.11.  Expected volatility deviates 
from benchmarks based on peer assumptions with a mean of 0.00 (by design) and 
a standard deviation of 0.12.  
Panels A and B of Table 6 provide the correlations between the different 
benchmarks for both volatility and life.  For life the correlations range from 0.58 
to 0.73 when 	  is excluded.  The correlations with 	  range 
from 0.29 to 0.51.  	  , unlike the other benchmarks, has no direct 
connection to historical ESO holdings or economic factors.  For volatility, the 
correlations range from 0.75 to 0.97 when  is excluded.  Correlations 
with  range from 0.70 to 0.82.   The results suggests all of the 
benchmarks are consistent with each other but provide unique information.  Panel 
C shows the correlations of deviations from the benchmarks.  Deviations from life 
benchmarks are highly correlated with deviations from other life benchmarks.  
The most surprising of those correlations are the strong positive correlations 
between deviations from the economic benchmarks and the deviation from own 
report history, ranging from 0.36 to 0.41.  The same is true for volatility  
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Table 5 
Benchmarks and Deviations from Benchmarks 
This table provides descriptive statistics for four benchmarks for both expected life and expected volatility.   
	  is the reported expected life.  	 is the measure of historical life of ESOs held my all 
employees.  	
 is the fitted value of historical ESO life against explanatory regressors.  	 is 
the average reported expected life for the previous five years.  	
  is the fitted value of expected life 
against explanatory regressors.   is the reported expected volatility.   is stock price volatility for 
the prior five years.    is the fitted value of historical volatility against explanatory regressors.  
 is the average reported expected volatility for the previous five years.    is the fitted value of 
expected life against explanatory regressors. 
 
Panel A:  Life 
 
   
Percentile 
  N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Benchmarks  
LifeHist 3,442 4.15 1.43 2.30 3.11 4.12 5.18 6.00 
	
 3,312 4.14 0.86 3.04 3.67 4.24 4.72 5.09 
LifeHist10K 12,108 5.63 1.43 4.00 4.73 5.40 6.40 7.40 
	
  2,728 5.52 0.63 4.77 5.09 5.49 5.92 6.38 
Benchmark-Adjusted Life 
	 V 	 2,946 1.40 1.58 -0.41 0.33 1.28 2.32 3.48 
	 V 	
 2,831 1.41 1.37 -0.24 0.51 1.27 2.24 3.07 
	 V 	 11,257 -0.06 0.78 -0.92 -0.30 0.00 0.23 0.74 
	 V 	
  2,728 0.00 1.17 -1.32 -0.74 -0.07 0.65 1.44 
Panel B:  Volatility 
 
   
Percentile 
  N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Benchmarks  
VolHist 64,548 0.52 0.27 0.22 0.31 0.46 0.68 0.91 
  53,297 0.54 0.20 0.30 0.41 0.53 0.66 0.79 
 30,773 0.53 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.47 0.69 0.91 
  27,762 0.50 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.63 0.80 
Benchmark-Adjusted Volatility 
 V  30,627 0.00 0.15 -0.15 -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.13 
 V   28,050 0.00 0.18 -0.19 -0.11 -0.02 0.09 0.20 
 V  28,300 0.00 0.13 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.13 
 V    27,762 0.00 0.14 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.13 
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Table 6 
Correlation between Benchmark-Adjusted Life and Volatility Assumptions 
The following tables provide the Pearson correlation among the life and volatility benchmarks and 
assumptions in the 10-K adjusted by the various benchmarks.  The p-value to test the hypothesis that the 
correlation is equal to zero is in parentheses. 
Panel A:  Life Benchmarks 
 
	 	
 	 	
  
	 
1.00 
        
	
 
0.60 1.00 
(<0.01)       
	 
0.33 0.29 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01)     
	
  
0.73 0.58 0.51 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)   
Panel B:  Volatility Benchmarks 
 
      
 
1.00 
        
  
0.75 1.00 
(<0.01)       
 
0.79 0.70 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01)     
  
0.97 0.84 0.82 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)   
(Continued) 
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Table 6-Continued 
Panel C:  Interaction between Volatility and Life Benchmarks 
  


 


V


 


 


 


V







 


 


V


 




 


 


V







 
	

 


V
	





 
	

 


V
	







 
	

 


V
	







	

 


V
	







 

V   
1.00   
                

V   
0.50 1.00            
(<0.01)               

V  
0.36 0.39 1.00         
(<0.01) (<0.01)             

V    
0.90 0.76 0.41 1.00       
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)           
	
V 	 
-0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.07 1.00     
0.44 (<0.01) (0.25) (<0.01)         
	
V 	
 
-0.02 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.73 1.00    
(0.20) (<0.01) (0.66) (<0.01) (<0.01)       
	
V 	  
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.31 1.00   
(0.22) (0.82) (0.62) (0.84) (<0.01) (<0.01)     
	
V 	
  
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.75 0.85 0.37 1.00 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)   
 
benchmarks with correlations to deviations from own history ranging from 0.25 to 
0.37.  Thus a departure from the historical and economic benchmarks is often a 
departure from own history in the same direction.  Finally, Panel C also shows 
that deviations from volatility benchmarks are mostly positively related to 
deviations from life benchmarks but with low values.  This is potentially a strong 
result in the sense that theory would suggest that deviations should be negatively 
correlated if the assumptions make economic sense.  The lack of a negative 
correlation indicates either intentional manipulation of values or irrational 
expectations of the future. 
Deviating from “true” values for the model assumptions creates variability 
in reported value of options granted and consequently earnings, pro-forma before 
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SFAS 123(R) and directly after SFAS 123(R).  Table 7 quantifies the impact of 
deviations from benchmark values on FMV and earnings per share.  The baseline 
value is the FMV based on benchmark values and the change is the FMV 
calculated from reported values minus the benchmark FMV.  Panel A shows the 
interquartile spread (value for 75th percentile less value for the 25th percentile) in 
percent change in FMV ranges from 18% to 37% for the various benchmarks.  
The change in earnings per share has an interquartile spread that ranges from 1.7 
cents to 3.4 cents per share and extends to 7.8 cents per share on average between 
the 10th and 90th percentile values. 
 
Table 7 
 Deviation from Benchmark Sensitivity 
This table demonstrates the change in Fair Market Value (FMV) and Earnings Per Share (EPS) in dollars 
where the baseline case is the Black-Scholes value calculated from the benchmark values and the deviation is 
based on the Black-Scholes value using the assumptions in the 10-K.  I assume all options granted during the 
fiscal year are expensed immediately. 
Panel A:  Percent Change in FMV 
    Percentile 
Assumptions N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
	,  2,791 12% 23% -14% 1% 14% 27% 36% 
	
,   2,682 4% 34% -36% -11% 10% 26% 39% 
	 ,  10,478 -3% 18% -25% -11% 0% 7% 15% 
	
 ,    2,587 -3% 23% -28% -13% 0% 10% 19% 
Panel B:  Change in EPS 
    Percentile 
Assumptions N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
	,  2,755 -0.030 0.550 -0.073 -0.034 -0.010 0.000 0.010 
	
,   2,678 -0.010 0.580 -0.066 -0.026 -0.005 0.007 0.039 
	 ,  10,225 0.000 0.500 -0.025 -0.007 0.000 0.010 0.036 
	
 ,    2,587 0.010 0.600 -0.028 -0.009 0.000 0.010 0.034 
 
D.  Incentives to Manipulate Reported ESO Expense 
The previous section demonstrates that deviations from benchmark values have a 
significant impact on reported ESO expense and earnings.  The slightly positive 
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correlation (and hence a lack of negative correlation) between deviations from life 
benchmarks and volatility benchmarks suggests manipulation of values or 
irrational expectations of the future.  This section tests for possible incentives to 
manipulate the assumptions and the subsequent effect of deviations on volatility 
and cumulative abnormal returns.  Unlike traditional earnings management where 
managers shift profits across time, when FMV of options is underreported, there 
is no truing up at any point.  Thus the effect is permanent and the temptation in 
certain circumstances can be high.  I test for manipulation where incentives are 
high.  Since manipulation of earnings carries risk of punishment, I also test the 
responsiveness of option price to changes in the assumptions.  I estimate the 
following logistic equations: 
 
logit[Pr 8	^1 F 1:
F G H G?*4_@##B$# H GK 4)U#S1B#
H GL`aTSIb H GM *II#U$ H GN 5J)S%5U)%)$SCSa
H GO	S8")*%%)%: H GP C3@+_C	 H GQ".)$ 
(4) 
 
logit[Pr 8^1 F 1:
F G H G?*4_@##B$# H GK 4)U#S1B#
H GL`aTSIb H GM *II#U$ H GN 5J)S%5U)%)$SCSa
H GO	S8")*%%)%: H GP C3@+_C H GQa$ 
(5) 
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LifeQ1 and VolQ1 are dummy variable equal to one if the deviation from 
benchmarks for life and volatility respectively rank in the lowest quartile (hence 
the strongest deviation downwards).  The variables equal 0 if the respective 
deviations are in the top half of the distribution.  I choose a Logit model because 
there really isn’t any theory to explain why firms would overestimate their 
assumption.  Thus I would not expect the specified relationship to fit the data for 
observations that overestimate assumptions.  I also remove the second quartile of 
data because it is not clear if that group is just part of the distribution about the 
mean or a group of firms that is possibly manipulating the assumptions.   
 CAR_PriorYear is the cumulative monthly abnormal returns based on the 
market model for the fiscal year.    Return1Yr is the stock return for the fiscal 
year.  I predict a positive coefficient for both return measures since managers of 
firms with negative returns, either absolute or relative to expectations, may be 
motivated to underreport to disguise compensation and improve the appearance of 
earnings.  NegIncome is a dummy variable for negative net income.  I predict a 
positive coefficient since managers can reduce the losses through ESO expense 
manipulation.  Accrual is the accounting accruals as defined by Subramanyam 
(1996).  I predict a positive estimate since firms looking to improve accounting 
figures may use both paths to do so.  OptionsOutstanding is the number of options 
outstanding at the end of the year deflated by the number of shares outstanding 
and serves as a proxy for motivation to disguise ESO expense due to the relative 
size of the stock option program. Thus I predict a negative coefficient.  
ln(TotAssts) is the natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year.  Vega is 
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the derivative of the value of the options granted with respect to the volatility of 
the underlying stock.  I predict a negative coefficient for Vega since the 
responsiveness of manipulating determines the effect on FMV for a given amount 
of deviation.  I define Theta as the derivative of the value of the options granted 
with respect to the expected life of the option.6  All derivatives of option value are 
evaluated based on benchmark values of both life and volatility while risk-free 
rate and dividend yield are the assumptions reported in the 10-K.  The variables 
dEPS_dVol and dEPS_dLife are the derivative of EPS with respect to volatility 
and life respectively.  I predict positive coefficients for both variables as these 
variables represent the ability to impact the bottom line. 
 Table 8 provides estimation results for equations 4 and 5.   Most of the 
results are quite mixed between different benchmarks for the same measure.  It’s 
possible that a mechanical relationship exists that is not being picked up by the 
model.  Additionally, with the true effect on stock price undetermined, it could be 
that the expensing practices of a firm affect the explanatory variables.  For 
example, the return regressors suggest that profitable firms are more likely to 
understate stock options expense.  Nevertheless, it could be the case that these 
firms have influenced their returns by the practice of understating stock option 
expense.  Despite these possibilities, the tests for incentives to manipulate ESO 
expense in  
 
                                                 
6
 The Greek letter Theta is often used to describe the derivative of the option 
value with respect to the time of the life of the option that has passed.  In this case 
Theta has the same value but with the opposite sign since 0 years have elapsed at 
the time of grant. 
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Table 8 
Factors Affecting Deviations from Benchmarks 
The following tables provide logistic regression results for factors affecting the likelihood of deviations of 
model assumptions from benchmark values.  	  and  are the expected life and volatility 
assumptions in the 10-K respectively.  The benchmarks are defined in Tables 3 and 5.  CAR_PriorYear is the 
cumulative monthly abnormal returns based on the market model for the fiscal year.  Return1Yr is the stock 
return for the fiscal year. NegIncome is a dummy variable for negative net income.  Accrual is the accounting 
accruals as defined by Subramanyam (1996).  OptionsOutstanding is the number of options outstanding at the 
end of the year deflated by the number of shares outstanding.  ln(TotAssts) is the natural log of total assets at 
the end of the fiscal year.  Vega is the derivative of the value of the options granted with respect to the 
volatility of the underlying stock.  Theta is the derivative of the value of the options granted with respect to 
the remaining life of the option.  All derivatives of option value are evaluated based on benchmark values of 
the expected life and volatility and the reported values of the risk-free rate and dividend yield as stated in the 
10-K.  dEPS_dVol and dEPS_dLife are the number of options granted divided by shares outstanding 
multiplied by Vega and Theta respectively.   All variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th  percentiles.  All 
units are in 1000’s for presentation of coefficients.   Errors are clustered at the firm level and p-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
Panel A:  Expected Life 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
	
V 	 
(1) 
	
V 	
 
(2) 
	
V 	 
(3) 
	
V 	
 
(4) 
Intercept 
 
-3.09 -3.88 0.94 1.06 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.02) (0.17) 
CAR_PriorYear 
- 
-0.1 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 
(0.41) (0.67) (0.08) (0.65) 
Return1Yr 
- 
-0.18 -0.33 0.05 -0.01 
(0.18) (0.02) (0.46) (0.95) 
NegIncome + -0.53 -0.65 -0.01 -0.24 (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.95) (0.1) 
Accrual + -23241.3 -80230.8 -23250.5 -49044.5 (0.58) (0.02) (0.23) (0.12) 
OptionsOutstanding + -1.16 -0.69 -3.84 0.04 (0.33) (0.56) (<0.01) (0.97) 
Ln(TotAssts) ? 0.14 0.15 -0.08 -0.08 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.02) 
dEPS_dLife + 10.84 2.63 -3.02 -4.95 (0.01) (0.42) (0.04) (0.11) 
Theta + -0.25 0.28 0.23 -0.1 (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.32) 
N 
 
1,797 1,782 6,860 1,732 
Pseudo R-Squared 
 
.08 .08 .02 .01 
(Continued) 
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Table 8-Continued 
Panel B:  Volatility 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Predicted 
Sign 

V  
(1) 

V   
(2) 

V  
(3) 

V    
(4) 
Intercept 
 
-2.57 7.31 4.41 4.44 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
CAR_PriorYear 
- 
0.96 -0.86 0.45 0.24 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Return1Yr 
- 
-0.62 0.33 -0.51 -0.39 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
NegIncome + 0.35 -0.47 -0.55 0.01 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.92) 
Accrual + 18690.68 15111.07 -13591.8 23637.51 (0.17) (0.34) (0.3) (0.08) 
OptionsOutstanding + 0.49 0.58 4.78 -2.42 (0.23) (0.21) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Ln(TotAssts) ? 0.09 -0.42 -0.26 -0.25 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
dEPS_dVol + -0.47 -0.51 0.8 -0.68 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Vega + -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.14) 
N 
 
11,638 11,129 9,712 11,095 
Pseudo R-Squared 
 
.14 .17 .10 .06 
 
this dissertation are very similar to those claiming to find a causal relationship, yet 
the results of this dissertation yield no such results.  
 
E.  Effect of Deviations on Subsequent Stock Price   
I propose there are at least two channels through which stock options expense 
may impact firm valuation. The more obvious channel is through reported 
earnings.  Nevertheless, the stated assumptions may also influence the investor 
valuing the liability of all outstanding options plus the implications of the delta 
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and vega of the outstanding options.  Probably the most interesting research 
question with respect to this topic is whether or not investors create their own 
assumptions for stock option valuation (perhaps in a fashion similar to the 
benchmarks in this dissertation) or if they take the stock option expense at face 
value.  This question is very difficult to answer.  Nevertheless, I hypothesize that 
noisy reporting of stock option assumptions leads to additional volatility beyond 
expected levels.  I test this hypothesis by estimating the following equation: 
 
4%C F G H G 	`% H GK `% H GL	`%
K
H GM `%
K H TSCU%)#' 3I)% 
(6) 
 
VolResid is the residual of the estimation of equation B1 for the two year period 
following the end of the fiscal year based on daily data.  Equation B1 fits the 
firm’s actual volatility to factors explaining volatility.  Thus the residual of that 
estimation is the difference of the actual volatility and the expected volatility.  
LifeNoise is the absolute value of 	 V 	 , 	 V 	
 , 
	 V 	 , and  	 V 	
 for regressions 1 thru 4 
respectively.  `% is the absolute value of  V  ,  V
7%) , 10dV7%)10d , and  10dV10d  for regressions 1 thru 
4 respectively.  Industry effects are defined per the Fama-French 30 definitions. 
 The four estimations of Equation 6 are shown in Panel A of Table 9.  
Regressions 1, 2, and 4 support the hypothesis that noise in stock option expense 
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assumptions leads to greater noise in stock price in the subsequent years.  
Interestingly, the effect is attenuated with larger values of noise. 
 Another measure of price discovery that may be useful in this analysis is 
the cumulative abnormal return following the release of the 10-K.  The ex-post 
returns could follow several patterns depending upon the theory of events.  If 
investors take the assumptions at face value the cumulative abnormal returns 
could be negatively related deviations in assumptions.  If investors eventually see 
through deviations or even elect punish a firm for underestimating ESO expense, 
cumulative abnormal returns could be positively related to deviations.  Panel B of 
Table 9 shows there are significant relationships with CARs.  Nevertheless, with 
predictive theory unable to pinpoint the likely outcome, the most conservative 
conclusion is that there is some effect on subsequent stock price due to deviations 
in assumptions. 
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Table 9 
Effect of Reporting Variability on Subsequent Volatility and Returns 
The following table provides regression results for subsequent stock price volatility and cumulative abnormal 
returns as a function of the deviations from the benchmark values of expected life and expected volatility.  
The dependent variable in Panel A is the residual of the predicted volatility based on a regression similar to 
regression 1 of Table 5, Panel B.  The measurement period for subsequent volatility is one year beginning 
one month after the end of the fiscal year.  The dependent variable in Panel B is the cumulative abnormal 
monthly return based on the market model for the same period of time.  LifeDev is the absolute value of 
	 V 	 , 	 V 	
 , 	 V 	  , 	 V 	
  for regressions 1 thru 
4 respectively.  `% is the absolute value of  V  ,  V   ,  V
7%)10d , 10dV10d  for regressions 1 thru 4 respectively.  LifeDev and VolDev are defined the 
same as LifeNoise and VolNoise  but are merely the difference without taking the absolute value.   
+aSC	2AK and +aSC2AK are the squared valued of  LifeDev and VolDev with the original sign 
applied to the squared value.  The coefficients on the life measures are multiplied by 1000 to show the precise 
value.  All tests control for industry fixed effects defined by Fama-French 30 industry definitions.     All 
variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A:  Subsequent Residual Volatility 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.21 (1.98) 
0.21 
(1.91) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(2.2) 
LifeNoise 15.5 (2.37) 
9.3 
(1.17) 
-1.6 
(-0.19) 
2.47 
(0.2) 
VolNoise 0.16 (1.48) 
0.25 
(2.77) 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.31 
(2.55) 
	`%K 
-2.26 
(-1.85) 
-1.82 
(-1.23) 
2.08 
(0.54) 
-0.25 
(-0.07) 
`%K 
-0.69 
(-2.65) 
-0.48 
(-2.28) 
-0.47 
(-1.95) 
-1 
(-2.7) 
N 2,639 2,631 8,851 2,526 
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Panel B:  Subsequent Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.14 (-1.22) 
-0.22 
(-2.39) 
0.11 
(1.08) 
-0.09 
(-0.72) 
LifeDev 34.56 (2.13) 
9.53 
(0.55) 
-6.27 
(-0.29) 
-8 
(-0.34) 
VolDev -1.45 (-5.98) 
1.03 
(6.52) 
0.82 
(5.24) 
-0.2 
(-0.76) 
+aSC	2AK -1.1 (-0.32) 
4.01 
(0.97) 
13.45 
(1.13) 
7.54 
(0.78) 
+aSC2AK 2 (2.35) 
0 
(0.01) 
-2.08 
(-3.34) 
1.02 
(0.87) 
N 2,639 2,631 8,851 2,526 
R-Squared 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.13 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This is the first paper to measure the average historical life of ESOs of a 
broad set of firms, analyze factors driving the average life, and relate those 
findings to stated assumptions of expected life of ESOs.  I find the mean life of 
ESOs to be consistent with another study using data from all employees, but 
shorter than the holding period for studies based on executives alone.  The 
average reported expected life is higher than the average holding period.  I find 
long run volatility, percentage of options granted to executives, vesting schedule, 
peak returns, risk-free rate, dividend yield, market to book, return on assets, and 
industry have the greatest impact on exercise behavior.  I also find firms 
incorporate their own historical holdings into reported expected life, factor in the 
age of the options outstanding at the end of the year, and generally align their 
assumptions with industry peers.  These results are qualitatively similar to results 
based on executives only but the model has significantly strong explanatory 
power. 
I find deviations of reported assumptions from benchmark values are often 
a deviation from prior reported values in the same direction.  Deviations from life 
benchmarks are slightly positively correlated with deviations from volatility 
benchmarks suggesting intentional manipulation of ESO expense or irrational 
expectations of the future.  The net impact of these departures from benchmarks 
results in significant changes if FMV and reported earnings. 
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I test incentives to manipulate reported expense and stock option 
characteristics that may affect stock price.  Unlike the extant literature, I do not 
find direct evidence of a relationship between deviations from benchmarks and 
incentives to manipulate ESO expense.  Nevertheless, my results indicate subtle 
manipulation or irrational expectations of the future. 
Noise in stock option expensing is important to the degree that it affects 
stock valuations.  I show that deviations from benchmarks, both positive and 
negative, increase the subsequent excess volatility.  I find statistically significant 
relationships between deviations from benchmarks and subsequent cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Nevertheless, the underlying theory remains to be pinpointed. 
The formation of benchmarks highlights the difficulties firms face in 
creating expectations for future results.  Expected volatility should be based on 
historical volatility which is an easily obtained measurement for both the firm and 
the firm’s peers.  Yet deviation from own history, a simple and straightforward 
measurement, still has a standard deviation of 0.15.  Expected life is even more 
difficult since the measurement window time span is subjective, treatment of 
outstanding options requires more expectations based on beliefs, and information 
about peers is not publicly available.  Thus it is unclear how precise the 
benchmarks are and how much error there is in the firm’s estimates of the future.  
Tests for manipulation suggests there are firm characteristics that lead to over and 
understating, but the reasoning behind these relationships is not yet clear.  Future 
improvements to this study will improve the explanatory power of the regression-
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based benchmarks and attempt to provide better specification for models that 
explain the deviations from benchmarks. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
The data for this dissertation are not widely available data, and thus require 
significant time and resources to collect.  For the sample period 1998 to 2009, 
Compustat provides most of the data required but does not report the ESO 
valuation assumptions until 2004.  The proprietary database supplied by Verus 
Research provides these assumptions for all dates for a subset of firms.  For 
analysis of valuation assumptions, this study utilizes the Verus data only.  
Additionally the data are filtered for firms that grant predominantly 10 year 
options.  The first column of Panel A of Table A1 shows that the Verus universe 
of firms is 3,575 of the 9,819 firms in Compustat that had options outstanding at 
some point during the sample period. 
Additionally, Compustat does not report the weighted average remaining 
life of the options outstanding, a key component to determining the average life of 
the ESOs that were terminated during the fiscal year.  This too is collected by 
Verus research.  Nevertheless, at the time of original collection, the purpose of 
these data was not specified and certain collection practices made many of the 
firm-years invalid.  These data are being corrected at the time of the writing of 
this dissertation, but the usable data are a subset of the Verus data.  The first 
column of Panel A of Table A1 shows that 739 firms of 3,575 firms have at least 
one firm-year with a seven year average for ESO life. 
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Table A1 
Selection Bias Analysis 
The following table provides analysis to determine the extent of selection bias from the overall Compustat 
universe of firm with options outstanding, to the subsample of firms in the proprietary data provided by 
Verus Research, to the sub-subsample of firms with historical ESO life.  All variables are defined in Tables 3 
and 5.  Panel A provides the percentage of firms in each industry as defined by the Fama-French 30 industry 
classifications for each dataset.  Panel B provides basic statistics for key regressors for the three groups.   
Panel A:  Industry Comparison 
  Industry 
Sample N Firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
All with 
Options 9819 2% 0% 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 12% 2% 0% 2% 1% 3% 1% 
Assump 
Data 3575 2% 0% 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 10% 2% 0% 3% 1% 3% 1% 
Historical 
ESO Life 739 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 11% 3% 0% 2% 2% 4% 2% 
 Industry 
Sample 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
All with 
Options 1% 1% 3% 0% 4% 2% 3% 14% 13% 1% 2% 3% 4% 2% 16% 1% 
Assump 
Data 1% 1% 1% 0% 4% 4% 3% 13% 12% 1% 2% 3% 6% 2% 17% 0% 
Historical 
ESO Life 1% 1% 0% 0% 3% 4% 2% 11% 11% 2% 3% 3% 7% 1% 16% 0% 
Panel B:  Key Regressor Comparison 
 N  Mean 
 All 
With 
Options 
Assumption 
Data 
Historical 
ESO Life 
 All With 
Options 
Assumption 
Data 
Historical 
ESO Life 
5PctTop  62,558 26,632 9,425  0.32 0.31 0.29 
Vest 62,540 26,644 9,421  2.25 2.23 2.24 
    27,540 21,439 8,603  0.61 0.48 0.46 
(((((((((( 57,335 24,646 9,041  0.09 0.06 0.05 
4)5(((((( 33,710 23,952 9,117  0.33 1.14 1.15 
/$>4)5(((((((((((( 34,011 24,024 9,129  0.57 0.42 0.42 
?*@/1)$((((((((((((((( 29,824 22,332 8,803  1.1 1.17 1.12 
2
AB
C((((((((((((
 
55,074 24,050 9,026  0.01 0.01 0.01 
ln 8")*%%)%:(((((((((((((((((( 60,032 25,512 9,212  17.94 20.41 20.76 
ln 8+$%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( 49,031 23,014 8,450  0.15 0.18 0.15 
//1(((((( 62,979 26,663 9,438  1.02 2.16 2.56 
2/3(((((( 33,670 23,550 8,925  0.7 0.52 0.45 
45*(((((( 59,832 25,488 9,203  -0.4 -0.02 -0.02 
4&2(((((( 60,032 25,512 9,212  0.08 0.05 0.05 
77((((( 52,148 24,498 8,936  0.14 0.13 0.14 
(Continued) 
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Table A1-Continued 
Panel C:  Heckman Selection Model for Historical Volatility 
 Selection Model 
(p-value in parentheses) 
(1) 
Structural Model 
(t-statistic in parentheses) 
(2) 
Intercept -20.61 (<.01) 
1.21 
(28.98) 
ln 8")*%%)%:(((((((((((((((((( 
1.05 
(<.01) 
-0.04 
(-32.79) 
ln 8+$%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( 
0.55 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(5.06) 
(((((((((( 
-0.39 
(<.01) 
0.42 
(10.65) 
//1(((((( 
0.19 
(<.01) 
0.01 
(5.02) 
2/3(((((( 
-0.42 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(18.56) 
45*(((((( 
0.78 
(<.01) 
-0.25 
(-12.65) 
4&2(((((( 
2.31 
(<.01) 
0.24 
(7.04) 
?$J>(((((((( 
1.14 
(<.01) 
0.18 
(3.91) 
Two Digit SIC Code 
Dummies where both are 
models are significant 
5 of 71 
Heckman Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.004 
(t-statistic = -0.18) 
(Continue) 
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Table A1-Continued 
Panel D:  Heckman Selection Model for Historical ESO Life 
 
Selection Model 
(p-value in parentheses) 
(1) 
Structural Model 
(t-statistic in parentheses) 
(2) 
Intercept -11.33 (<.01) 
6.02 
(4.8) 
5PctTop  0.96 (<.01) 
1.13 
(3.39) 
Vest 0.07 (<.01) 
0.12 
(2.34) 
    
1.15 
(<.01) 
-4.04 
(-6.97) 
(((((((((( 
-1.54 
(<.01) 
-0.56 
(-1) 
4)5(((((( 
0.01 
(0.53) 
-0.05 
(-1.49) 
/$>4)5(((((((((((( 
-0.27 
(<.01) 
0.81 
(3) 
?*@/1)$((((((((((((((( 
-0.01 
(0.81) 
0.13 
(1.33) 
2
AB
C((((((((((((
 
5.96 
(<.01) 
-12.69 
(-3.75) 
ln 8")*%%)%:(((((((((((((((((( 
0.45 
(<.01) 
0.04 
(0.99) 
ln 8+$%,#-).:((((((((((((((((((((((( 
0.27 
(<.01) 
-0.13 
(-0.56) 
//1(((((( 
0.08 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(2.19) 
2/3(((((( 
-0.3 
(<.01) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
45*(((((( 
1.02 
(<.01) 
0.63 
(1.98) 
4&2(((((( 
2.06 
(<.01) 
0.76 
(0.91) 
77((((( 
-0.12 
(0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
Fama-French 30 Industry 
Dummies where both are 
models are significant 
2 of 30 
Heckman Correlation 
Coefficient 
-0.058 
(t-statistic = -0.24) 
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The historical selection of firms into the Verus database is considered by 
Verus to be a randomized process but the continuing refinement of the data is 
biased towards larger firms.  The firms with adequate data for average ESO life 
calculations are considered a random subsample of the Verus firms, thus they 
should be no more biased than the overall Verus sample.  To test for selection 
bias, I focus on specification of regression 1 of Table 3 and regression 1 of Table 
5.  Both of these regressions explain the historical volatility and historical ESO 
life respectively.  Panel A of Table A1 shows the distribution of firms in the 
sample by industry under the Fama-French 30 industry definition.  Both 
subsamples of data closely match Compustat with the greatest differences being 
for industries 20 and 27.  Panel B shows the count and means for the key 
regressors of the two regressions focused on in this appendix.  There do appear to 
be differences between Compustat and both subsets of data.  With Verus focusing 
on larger firms, it appears the Verus universe consists of firms that are larger, 
more profitable, and less volatile.  These factors could be important in explaining 
variations in historical volatility and historical ESO life. 
To better characterize the effects of these differences in the data, I utilize 
the Heckman (1979) selection model.  Under this model, rho represents the 
correlation of errors between the structural model of interest and the selection 
model that determines if the data do or do not appear in the structural model.  An 
insignificant test of rho does not reject the null hypothesis that rho is equal to zero 
and that the selection model does not influence the estimates of the structural 
model.  Panels C and D both show that many variables are significant in both the 
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selection of data that appear in the structural model and the structural model itself.  
Nevertheless, both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that rho is equal to zero.  
Thus I conclude that while the data are skewed towards larger more stable firms, 
the implications of the key estimations are not adversely affected. 
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APPENDIX B 
HISTORICAL VOLATILITY 
I construct four benchmarks similar to the expected life benchmarks.  The first 
benchmark is actual historical volatility, VolHist .  It is defined as the annualized 
standard deviation of the natural log of one plus the monthly return, measured 
over the previous five years.  The second benchmark,   , is fitted value 
based on the following regression: 
 
 F G H G H GK log8")*%%)%:
(((((((((((((((((( H GL log8+$%,#-).:
((((((((((((((((((((((((
H GM//1(((((( H GN2/3(((((( H GO45*(((((( H GP"#$%7'#(((((((((((((HGQ4&2((((((
H GR?*@3e(((((((((( H TSCU%)#' f>C 3I)% 
(B1) 
 
 is the annualized volatility of monthly returns for the previous five 
years for the value-weighted portfolio as defined by CRSP.   All other variables 
have been previously defined and a bar over any variable means the variable is 
averaged over the previous five years.  Industry fixed effects are defined by two 
digit SIC code due to the larger data set for historical volatility as compared to 
historical ESO life. 
 Panel A of Table B1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample for 
volatility estimation.7  The first regression in Table B1 provides the estimates of 
Equation B2.  Historical volatility, as specified in this model, is largely driven by 
                                                 
7
 The sample for expected life estimation is considerable smaller due to reductions 
to confirmed 10 year grants and the costly nature of manual cleaning of the data.  
When volatility is analyzed apart from expected life, the sample size is 
considerably larger. 
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market volatility, firms size, D/E, and ROA with standardized coefficients of 
0.20, -0.31, 0.16, and -0.23 respectively.  Industry fixed effects contribute an 
additional 8 percentage points to adjusted R-Squared. 
The third benchmark, VolHist10K, is the average of the reported expected 
volatility for the previous five years.  I require a minimum of four observations to  
form this benchmark.  The fourth benchmark, , is the is the fitted value 
based on the following regression: 
 
 F G H Gg H GKNg H G310d,TSC H G4/$#j)
H  G
5
log8")*%%)%:((((((((((((((((( H G
6
log8+$%,#-).:(((((((((((((((((((((( H G
7
//1((((((
H G
8
2/3((((( H G
9
45*(((((( H G
10
"#$%7'#HG
11
4&2(((((( H G
12
?*@3e(((((((((
H TSCU%)#' f>C 3I)% 
(B2) 
  
VolHist1yr, VolHist5yr, and  Vol10K, Ind are the annualized one year historical 
volatility of daily returns, annualized five year historical volatility of monthly 
returns, and median contemporaneous reported expected volatility for the 2-digit 
SIC code. All other variables have been previously defined.  Averaged values, as 
indicated with a bar, are averaged over the prior 5 years as an expectation of 
future values.  Industry fixed effects are defined by the 2-digit SIC code.   
The second column of Panel B of Table B1 provides estimation results for 
Equation B2.  When determining expected volatility for the 10-K, firms consider 
their own historical volatility (coefficients of .10 and .59 for short-term and long-
term respectively), contemporaneous stated value for the industry (coefficient of  
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Table B1 
Factors Affecting Volatility 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in Panel A.  Panel B presents regressions results for 
formulation of the volatility benchmarks   and    .  VolHist1yr , VolHist, VolMarket,  Vol10K, Ind,    and 
Vol10K are the 1 year historical volatility of returns, 5 year historical volatility of returns, 5 year historical 
volatility returns of the market, median expected volatility for the 2-digit industry code, and expected 
volatility stated in the 10-K respectively.  TotAsst  is the total assets in billions.   Salesgrowth is the 
percentage change in sales.  M/B is the market to book ratio.  D/E is total debt divided by market equity.  
ROA is operating income divided by total assets. Treas7yr is the implied return on a seven year government 
bond.  R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets.  CAPEX is capital expenditures 
divided by total assets.  All variables with a bar above them are averaged over the previous five years.  All 
tests control for industry fixed effects defined by 2-digit SIC code.  All variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  Errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Panel C 
provides descriptive statistics for all four benchmarks, the differences between the benchmarks, and the 
difference between volatility as stated in the 10-K and the benchmark.  VolHist10K is the average of reported 
10-K volatility for the previous five years. 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
 
   
Percentile 
  N Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
 0.49 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.44 0.64 0.85 0.49 
 0.49 0.25 0.23 0.31 0.44 0.63 0.83 0.49 
g 0.53 0.30 0.23 0.32 0.45 0.67 0.93 0.53 
, 0.48 0.16 0.26 0.35 0.49 0.60 0.69 0.48 
 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.15 
")*%%)%(((((((((((( 4.70 14.02 0.05 0.16 0.65 2.49 9.93 4.70 
+$%,#-).((((((((((((((((( 0.24 0.52 -0.02 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.53 0.24 
 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.05 
//1(((((( 2.48 2.38 0.01 1.01 1.83 3.22 5.60 2.48 
2/3(((((( 0.50 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.53 1.24 0.50 
45*(((((( -0.04 0.26 -0.22 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 -0.04 
Treas7yr 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 
4&2(((((( 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.05 
?*@3e(((((((((( 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.05 
(Continued) 
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Table B1-Continued 
Panel B:  Regression results for Volatility benchmark. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
  
 
(1) (2) 
Intercept 0.92 (22.7) 
0.39 
(13.7) 
g 
 
0.10 
(14.12) 
 
 
0.59 
(52.3) 
, 
 
0.16 
(8.26) 
 
1.86 
(59.92) 
0.01 
(0.38) 
log 8")*%%)%((((((((((((((((((: 
-0.04 
(-34.6) 
-0.02 
(-20.08) 
log 8+$%,#-).(((((((((((((((((((((((: 
0.04 
(6.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
 
0.36 
(11.45) 
0.03 
(1.32) 
//1(((((( 
0.01 
(6.84) 
0 
(0.72) 
2/3(((((( 
0.04 
(19.44) 
0 
(0.17) 
45*(((((( 
-0.21 
(-10.82) 
-0.03 
(-2.88) 
"#$%7'#((((((((((((( 81:, "#$%7'#82: 
0.18 
(1.09) 
0.83 
(7.79) 
4&2(((((( 
0.26 
(8.76) 
0.08 
(3.19) 
?*@3e(((((((((( 
0.07 
(1.7) 
-0.03 
(-0.79) 
N 53,297 27,762 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.56 0.70 
 
 
0.16),  and many other factors that may drive future volatility including total 
assets (negative), ROA (negative), seven year government bond yield (positive), 
and R&D expenditures (positive).  Unlike expected life, the determination of 
expected volatility closely matches the coefficients that drive historical volatility. 
